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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
Case No. 17367 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION APPEALS 
BOARD, AND ELLIS V. FLINT, 
Defendants and Respondents 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF, 
BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition seeking review of a final order of the 
Compensation Appeals Board of the Utah State Industrial Commission. 
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Section 35-4-10 UCA 
(1953, as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Applicant Ellis v. Flint, upon his initial application for 
unemployment benefits, after leaving his employment with Box Elder 
County, was denied unemployment benefits on the basis that he 
voluntarily quit without good cause. He appealed that decision 
~~appeals referee; and the referee held that he had quit with-
out good cause, and denied benefits. Mr. Flint then appealed to 
the Compensation Appeals Board, and the Board reversed the previous 
and granted unemployment benefits, finding that Mr. Flint 
leave 1-1ork with good cause. The plaintiff requested 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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I 
the Board to reconsider its decision, and this request '"' '"'I 
Plaintiff then filed a petition seeking a writ of review; and tr 
Clerk of the Supreme Court issued the writ, causing the entire 
record to be filed with the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek an order reversing the decision of ~ 
Compensation Appeals Board and reinstating the decision of the 
appeals referee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Claimant, Flint, commenced employment with Box Elder 
County on April 1, 1979, (R., page 25), and voluntarily quit worr. 
on March 14, 1980, (R., page 33; R., pages 46 and 47; R., page Ii 
On April 29, 1980, he filed for unemployment benefits (R., page 
53), and filled out a statement explaining why he had voluntar) 
quit (R., pages 50, 51, 52). Flint was denied benefits on May 
20, 1980, (R., page 48), and on June 2, 1980, filed a letter 
wherein he requested a hearing by an Appeals Referee (R., pages 
44, 45, 46, 47). 
A question as to the timeliness of the appeal was 
raised by the Appeals Referee and resolved in favor of the ··I 
claimant (R., pages 29, 30, 31, 32); and plaintiff does not d1°· 
pute that decision. The hearing before the Appeals Referee wasl 
held on July 25, 1980, following notification of the claimant I 
and the plaintiff; and Mr. Flint appeared representing himself· 
The plaintiff was represented by Don Chase, Chairman of the BOX 
Elder County Commission (R., page 32). 
-2-
Al though the plaintiff. I 
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through its auditor, originally contended that the notification 
of the July 25th hearing went to the wrong person, (R., pages 
10, 11), the plaintiff does not take that position on this appeal. 
At the hearing, claimant stated that he had voluntarily 
quit (R., page 5) because of chest pains he suffered while work-
ing (R., page 36). His stated reason for the chest pains was 
what he called harrassment by the Box Elder County Audi tor, Doris 
Olsen, (R., page 37). Flint stated that he was the only depart-
ment head working for Box Elder County who was required to keep 
track of his time by the Box Elder County Auditor {R., page 35). 
He objected to keeping time cards on the basis that other depart-
ment heads were not required to do so {R., page 3s), and he re-
fused to keep them (R., page 36). 
Flint suffered a coronary in the Fall of 1978 for which 
he was hospitalized {R., page 37) and upon being released, was 
told to avoid strenuous work (R., page 37). At the time he 
suffered his coronary, Flint was the Democratic candidate for 
the position of Box Elder County Audi tor, an election which he 
lost in November of 1978 to the current Box Elder County Auditor, 
Doris Olsen {R., page 34). 
Don Chase, the County's representative at the hearing, 
testified that the County Auditor was requiring Mr. Flint to 
file more detailed reports of his time than were required of 
other department heads {R., page 40), and that Flint had men-
tioned that he was experiencing chest pains (R., page 41) • 
-3-
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Chase also testified thai: he told Flint not to let it i 
I bother him (R., page 41), and also told him that the County Audi'i 
had no authority to fire him or take any punitive action against 1 
him for failure to file the time cards (R., page 41). Chase I 
I 
stated that he told Flint not to be bothered by the Auditor's I 
activities, because only the Commission could fire him (R I 
• , pag:I 
41). I 
Flint was the only department head who traveled betweel/ 
other county departments and county agencies performing maintena: 
work as needed, (R., page 5); and the County Auditor desired mart 
detailed reports from him because his time had to be charged to 
various departments (R., page 40). Other department heads are 
required to file time cards (R., page 40). 
Although Flint was seeing a physician regularly, he di' 
not report his chest pains to the doctor, and was not advised byl 
a physician to quit work (R., pages 33 and 34). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW THAT 
THE CLAIMANT QUIT WITH GOOD CAUSE. 
The original decision of the Board of Review in this 
case is found at page 14 of the Record; and the pertinent state-
ment made therein is contained in one sentence, as follows: 
"Because of the treatment being accorded to him 
by the employer, the claimant began experiencing 
angina. 11 
The Appeals Referee found that the claimant voluntarily 
left work without good cause, stating as follows: 
"Although the claimant may have been unduly 
singled out to submit the report of his hours, 
compliance with that request would not have 
created a significant hardship on the claimant. 
His resistance to the request complicated the 
issue and undoubtedly caused increased hard 
feelings, both for the claimant and the Auditor. 
The claimant could, therefore, have reduced 
the tensions on the job by complying with the 
request of submitting the report. It is con-
cluded that it was the claimant's resistance 
that caused his physical symptoms, rather than 
his actual job duties; and he could have reduced 
the threat to his health without quiting his job. 
He did not have a definite assurance at work at 
Hill Air Force Base at the time he quit." (R., page 26) 
The claimant filed a copy of a letter from his doctor, 
dated August 5, 1980, which has become part of the record (page 19); 
Which states as follows: 
"I have been the physician for Ellis Flint for 
the last seven years, and in November of 1978, 
he had an acute myocardial infarction. Since 
-5-
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that time, he has had intermittent chest pain 
which has occasion.;lly been related to exercise 
and also has been related to episodes of emo-
tional stress." 
"I ha·.:e been aware of pressures and stresses that 
the patient has had with respect to his work for 
some time and have monitored this over the past 
year. Recently, these stresses have increased 
and have been associated with an exacerbation 
of angina. It is my feeling that this is an ex-
tension of his underlying medical problem of 
documented coronary disease in the past. Had r 
been consulted with respect to this condition, 
it would have been my advice that Mr. Flint remove 
himself from the stressful situation which was 
precipitating his coronary disease. As I would 
have anticipated, his pain has stopped since he 
has been relieved of this." 
As can be seen, the only medical evidence appearing 
anywhere in the record is the letter from Dr. Blanch, which 
obviously was submitted subsequent to the date of the }•earing 
on July 25th. That letter points out that the cause of Mr. 
Flint's problems was emotional stress and pressures associated 
with his work; but, significantly, the doctor does not single 
out a factor which created the stress to begin with. 
Plaintiff submits that the evidence adduced at the 
hearing, as contained in the transcript, shows that the claimant 
created his own stress by absolutely refusing to perform a simple 
timekeeping chore. 
Furthermore, the claimant was made fully aware that tt:: 
Box Elder County Auditor had no authority over him, as Don Chase 
testified: 
-6-
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"I felt that really in our chain of command, 
so to speak, he was responsible to me; and 
there was, in my opinion, no reason for some 
of these things to be, you know, for him to 
be taking so much concern about them ... 
... Just let me explain what I'm saying here--
the chain of command. Actually, these people 
that he was having some problems with didn't 
have the authority or anything to fire him or 
anything of that nature. It had to come from 
the Commissioner. These are the things I was 
trying to explain to him. Just don't let those 
things bother you ... " (R., page 41). 
Also, the claimant was seeing a doctor regularly; but, 
by his own testimony, did not once report to the doctor that he 
was having any chest pains or that he was bothered by his problems 
at work until well after he quit. In response to the Referee's 
question at the hearing as to whether or not Mr. Flint had been 
advised by his physician to quit his job, Mr. Flint replied; 
"No, I didn't discuss this with my doctor; and 
I didn't really get into this the day that I 
came in here to quit." (R. page 34). 
Although the defendant may very well have suffered chest 
pains in connection with his employment, and although he claims 
the pains led him to be concerned enough for his heal th to quit 
his work, on the other hand the chest pains were not serious 
enough for him to even mention them to a doctor, whom he was 
seeing on a regular basis. 
The chest pains, according to the letter submitted by 
the claimant's physician, were caused by stress. The evidence 
in the record shows that the stress was caused not by the County 
Audi tor's attempt to have Mr. Flint file time cards, but rather 
was caused in Mr. Flint's own mind because of the hard feelings 
-7-
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created by his refusal to fill in any sort of time card. Mr. 
Flint's own stubborness caused the stress which, in turn, cause~ 
whatever problem he experienced. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests the court to reverse 
the decision of the Board of Review and reinstate the decisioo 
of the Appeal Referee on the basis that the evidence presented 
shows only that Mr. Flint created his own problems through h~ 
childish actions in refusing to meet an entirely reasonable r~ 
quirement requested of him by the Box Elder County Auditor. 
2tVjl 
Dated this~ of December, 1980. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Petition For Review to: Mr. Floyd G. A~ 
and Mr. K. Allan Zabel, Special Assistants Attorney General, The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, 
174 Social Hall Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147, postageP~ 
paid this ~of December, 1980. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
---
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE ............................................. . 
DISPOSITION BELOW ................................................................ . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
ARGUMENT .................. ····...................................................... 3 
POINT I ........................ ·........................................................ 3 
THAT IN REVIEWING THE DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL 
AFFIRM THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
POINT II................................................................................ 4 
SECTION 35-4-5(a), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, IS 
INTENDED TO DISQUALIFY FROM THE RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENE-
FITS ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED BY REASON OF 
THEIR OWN FAULT. 
POINT Ill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANT 
HEREIN HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING WORK. 
POINT IV............................................................................... 8 
CLAIMANT DID PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND TIMELY MEDICAL EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH GOOD CAUSE FOR TERMINATING HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
SUMMARY .............................................................................. 10 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
CASES CITED 
Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
(Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Deiss v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 475 Pa. 547, 381 A. 
2d 132 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah, 1977) 567 
P. 2d 626, 630 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment 
Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Krauss v. Mr. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N. J. 447, 100 A. 2d 27, 286 (1953)................. 5 
Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 4 77 P. 2d 587 (1970) ................ · · · · · · · · 3 
Millsv. Gronning, (Utah, 1978) 581P.2d 1334. .. ....... ................................ 4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 
Olaf Nelson Construction Company v. The Industrial Commission, 121 U. 521, 
243 P. 2d 951 (1952) ........................................................... . 
Stevenson Morgan, 17 Or. App. 428, 552 P. 2d 1204, 1206 (1974) .................... . 
Wilton v. Employment Division, 26 Or. App. 549, 553 P. 2d 1071 (1976) ............... .. 
STATUTES CITED 
I 
PAGf 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 35-4-5(a) ................................................ 1,4 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 35-4-10(d)(2) ............................................. 8 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 35-4-10(i) ............................................. 1,3,4 
II 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION APPEALS 
BOARD, and ELLIS V. FLINT, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 17367 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section 
35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, for the purpose of judicial review of a 
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, reversing the decision of 
the Appeal Referee, and allowing benefits to the claimant, Ellis V. Flint, on the grounds the 
claimant had left work voluntarily, but with good cause. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Defendant-Claimant Ellis v. Flint, upon his initial application for unemployment benefits, 
after leaving his employment with Box Elder County, was denied unemployment benefits by a 
Department Representative pursuant to Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979), on the ground that he voluntarily quit without good 
cause. He appealed that decision to an Appeals Referee who affirmed the disqualification in a 
de · · 
cision dated July 31, 1980. Mr. Flint then appealed to the Board of Review. The Board 
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reversed the decision of the Appeal Referee by a decision issued September 5, 1980, in Ca, 
No. 80-A-2109, 80-BR-245 and granted unemployment benefits. finding that Mr. Flint did leaii 
work with good cause. The Plaintiff requested the Board to reconsider its decision. Therequ~' 
was denied in a decision issued September 30, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board of Review which allowed benefitsto\hi 
claimants. Defendants seek affirmance of the decision of the Board of Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants, Board of Review. Department of Employment Security, and the lnduslrial 
Commission of Utah. substantially agree with the statement of facts set forth in Plaintiff's Briel. 
except in the following particulars, to wit: 
In 1978, the claimant, Ellis V. Flint, ran as the Democratic candidate for the officeo!Boi 
Elder County Auditor. In October, 1978, claimant suffered a serious heart attack and wa! 
hospitalized. Claimant lost the election to the current Box Elder County Auditor. Subsequenlli 
claimant was hired as Maintenance Supervisor by the Republican Chairman of the Box Elder 
County Commission, Mr. Don Chase. with the understanding that claimant would answeronl1 
to Mr. Chase, would not have to answer to any other county official and would run I~' 
maintenance department as he felt it should be run (R. pages 44, 45, and 53). Mr. Chase was 
Plaintiff's representative at the Appeal Referee's Hearing (R. page 32). 
Mr. Flint voluntarily quit because of chest pains which he attributed to harassment bylhe 
Box Elder County Auditor (R. page 36). There were feelings over claimant's position and high 
pay relative to the elected officials. The animosity stemmed from the election (R. pages39·41i 
There was no question about claimant putting in full time or sufficient time to accomplish his 
I 
work (R. page 39). One of the reasons given for demanding more detailed time reportstrom\he l 
' 
claimant was that such reports were necessary to make charges against other departments ' 
However, other department heads that did work in other departments were not requiredtokeei i 
the detailed time reports that the County Auditor was demanding from the claimant, Mr. Flin! I 
I 
(R. pages 35 and 40). 
2 
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While the animosity over the time reports precipitated claimant's resignation, there were 
other incidents that contributed. As an example, the County Auditor complained to the 
Commission that claimant was wasting time and asked the sheriff to back up her complaints 
when in fact claimant was discussing county business during the time complained of (R. pages 
36, 37, and 41 ). 
Claimant did not discuss quitting his job with his doctor prior to quitting (R. page 34). 
However, his doctor was aware of pressures and stresses that the claimant had with respect to 
his work and had monitored the situation for the past year. Had claimant consulted him with 
respect to quitting his job the doctor would have advised claimant to quit. The doctor's letter 
was new evidence to the Board of Review that had not been available to the Department 
Representative or the Appeals Referee (R. page 19). 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THAT IN REVIEWING THE DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL 
AFFIRM THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well established. 
Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provided in part: 
In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings of the Commission and the 
Board of Review as to the facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and the 
jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of law. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission and the Board 
01 Review are supported by evidence. they will not be disturbed, Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 
U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). In analyzing the above referenced review provision, this Court 
has stated: 
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"Under Section 35-4-1 O(i) the role of this Court is to sustain the determination of the 
Board of Review unless the record clearly and persuasively proves the action of the 
Board was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Specifically, as a matter of law 
the determination was wrong; because only the opposite conclusion could be draw~ 
from the facts." Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, (Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729. 
POINT II 
SECTION 35-4-5(a), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, IS INTENDEDTO 
DISQUALIFY FROM THE RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ONLY THOSt 
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED BY REASON OF THEIR OWN FAULT. 
Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides: 
35-4-5 An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishinga 
waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause 
if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter until the claimantha1 
performed services in bona fide covered employment and earned wages forsucn 
services equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount; provideo. 
that no claimant shall be ineligible for benefits if the claimant leaves work under 
circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary to equity and gooc 
conscience to impose a disqualification. 
The commission shall in cooperation with the employer consider fortne 
purposes of this act, the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent 
to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor 
market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant ii 
contrary to equity and good conscience. 
This Court has previously held that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist 
a worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his part. Kennecoll 
Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262,372P.20 
987 (1962); and that the Department is to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment 
compensation by adhering to the volitional test. Olaf Nelson Construction Company v. The 
Industrial Commission, 121 U. 521, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952); Mills v. Gronning, (Utah, 1978)581P I 
2d 1334. I 
4 
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However. a claimant voluntarily leaving work with good cause is in fact unemployed 
withOut fault. This Court explained the reason for the good cause exception in the following 
terms: 
"What is 'good cause' must reflect the underlying purpose of the Act to relieve against 
the distress of involuntary unemployment. The seeming paradox of allowing benefits 
to an individual whose unemployment is of his own volition disappears when the 
context of the words is viewed in that light. The legislature contemplated that when an 
individual voluntarily leaves a job under the pressure of circumstances which may 
reasonably be viewed as having compelled him to do so, the termination of his 
employment is involuntary for the purposes of the Act. In statutory contemplation he 
can not then reasonably be judged as free to stay at the job ... " Denby v. Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah, 1977) 567 P. 2d 626, 630, quoting 
Krauss v. Mr. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A. 2d 27, 286 (1953). 
The Court further explained "good cause" was limited to those instances where the 
unemployment was caused by external pressures so compelling a reasonably prudent person, 
exercising ordinary common sense and prudence, would be justified in quitting under similar 
circumstances. Mills v. Gronning, SUPRA., Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, SUPRA.; Stevenson Morgan, 17 Or. App. 428,552 P. 2d 1204, 1206 (1974); 
Wilton v. Employment Division, 26 Or. App. 549, 553 P 2d 1071 (1976). 
In the instant case the claimant voluntarily quit his employment, but under circumstances 
constituting good cause, as shall be more fully explained in Points Ill and IV hereof. 
POINT Ill 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANT 
HEREIN HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING WORK. 
The initial determination of good cause for voluntarily leaving work is a mixed question of 
law and fact to be made by the administrative agency; the claimant has the burden of showing 
good cause; and he must indicate an effort to work out the problems unless he can demonstrate 
that such efforts would be futile. Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, SUPRA. 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff's principle contention on appeal is that claimant created his own stress bi 
absolutely refusing to perform a simple time keeping chore. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 6). Theclaiman: 
contended, however, that he was being required by the County Auditor, his former political 
rival, to complete more detailed time reports than required of other department heads;thattne 
County Auditor complained unjustifiably to the County Commission that claimant waswastrn~ 
time on the job; and that such forms of harassment caused the claimant to have a recurrenceol 
chest pains and angina. 
The findings of the Board of Review in favor of the claimant are supported throughouttne 
record. First, with respect to the question of time reporting, Plaintiff's representative, Mr.Don 
Chase, who was also claimant's supervisor, testified that he discussed time keeping wiln 
claimant; that claimant "was very cooperative in reaching an educated estimation of howmucn 
of his time was spent in the ... " various departments; "then after some time-afterthiswasdone 
was the time that these reports surfaced." (R. page 40). 
" ... there are other department heads that do work ... in other departments that are 
not required-and it was during this type of discussion that Mr. Flint decided that he 
was being asked to do things that other department heads were not being required to 
do and, at one time was told that other department heads were filing these reports-if 
my memory is correct. And I looked into the detail as to whether these other 
department heads were actually being required to file reports in that much detail and 
they were not... It's true that some of our department heads do file a time card ... with 
the Auditor's department showing ... their 80-hour time period and that's it. He did not 
object to having a time card the same as the rest of them. It was the detailing the time 
report-accounting for every minute of every day that the objection came over ... and 
checking with other department heads, they were not required to account for where 
they were and what they were doing for the 8-hour period in detail every day. That1s 
the crux of what, at least what I felt, the problem was. And it was in the back and forth 
of trying to handle the animosity that seemed to have grown clear back from ... astaras 
the election ... " (R. pages 40 and 41). 
Second, with respect to claimant's contention of other harassment by the County Auditor 
Mr. Chase's testifimony was to the effect: 
(a) that there were feelings over claimant's salary which was higherthan any of 
the elected officials except possibly the County Attorney's (R. page 39). 
(b) that he never questioned that claimant put in a 40-hour week; thatclai.~ant 
was "very cooperative in putting in what time was necessary to get his job done; that 
claimant put in more than a 40-hour week and was on call "365 days a year, 24 hours a 
day ... he had to come when he was needed." (R. pages 39 and 40). 
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The claimant, Mr. Flint, also testified that the County Auditor spied upon him, and sought 
10 have the County Sheriff back her up in a complaint against claimant to the commissioners 
(A. pages 36 and 37). While Flint's testimony of what the sheriff said is hearsay and, therefore, 
can't be accepted as proving the truth of what the Auditor said, nevertheless, the sheriff's telling 
it to Flint, whether true or not, served to increase the stress and feelings of animosity Flint felt 
toward his political opponent. 
The claimant contended that the result of these difficulties with his former political rival 
was that he began to experience chest pains. 
When asked by the Referee whether he had pains at any particular times or following any 
particular circumstances the claimant responded: 
"Yes. It was always after one of these ... hassles. These problems that was 
coming from down there, was the only thing that would bring them on ... and 
nothing else has caused me the problems. I haven't had any since. And so, 
myself, I know what was causing them and I corrected it." (R. pages 37 and 38). 
The claimant further stated that although his supervisor, Mr. Chase, told him not to let it 
bother him, " ... a lot of it you can and some of it, you can't. And I just got scared. I'm still here and 
I may have been if I'd stayed there, but l ... it just wasn't worth it to me ... " (R. page 38). 
Plaintiff's representative, Mr. Chase, acknowledged that the claimant had mentioned his 
chest pains. He testified that claimant was responsible to him and there was no reason for 
claimant to be concerned about the detailed reports the Auditor was demanding. "But they did 
seem to bother him." (R. page41 ). Mr. Chase also testified that he and claimant had sought for 
some period of time to work the problem out but acknowledged he had no control over the 
County Auditor because she was also an elected official. " ... So, it's like having almost ten 
bosses at times." (R. page 41 ). 
Cl· 
aimant recognized that the problems at work were not resolvable and concluded he must 
quit because h s d t . . . . 
1 oc or had advised him 1n regard to his coronary: 
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" ' ... I can't tell you what you can and can't do ... As you work your way back to 
health ... you're going to be able to tell what you can and can't do. If anything starts to 
causing you shortness of breath, chest pains, discomfort, knock it off.'" (R. page37). 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the face of such testimony Defendants submit that the Board of Review had ample 
grounds to find that the claimant was being required to make reports which were not required 
of other department heads. Because of the treatment being accorded to him by the employer, 
the claimant began experiencing angina. Under such circumstances it must be consideredthat 
the claimant left work with good cause. 
POINT IV 
CLAIMANT DID PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND TIMELY MEDICAL EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH GOOD CAUSE FOR TERMINATING HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
Plaintiff complains that " ... the only medical evidence appearing anywhere in the record is 
the letter from Dr. Blanch, which obviously was submitted subsequent to the date of the 
hearing on July 25th ... " 
Section 35-4-10(d)(2). Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides: 
" ... Upon appeal the Board of Review may on the basis of the evidence previously 
submitted in such case, or upon the basis of such additional evidence as it may direct 
be taken, affirm, modify or reverse the findings, conclusions and decisions of the 
Appeal Referee ... " 
The above-referenced statute obviously grants authority to the Board to consider 1 
additional evidence on appeal. Therefore, even though the letter from Dr. Blanch was 
submitted subsequent to the date of the hearing before the Appeal Referee, the Board did not 
exceed its statutory authority by considering the letter on appeal. 
8 
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Plaintiff also complains that: 
" ... the claimant was seeing a doctor regularly; but, by his own testimony, did not once 
report to the doctor that he was having any chest pains or that he was bothered by his 
problems at work until well after he quit. In response to the Referee's question at the 
hearing as to whether or not Mr. Flint had been advised by his physician to quit his job, 
Mr. Flint replied: 'No, I didn't discuss this with my doctor; and I didn't really get into 
this the day that I came in here to quit.' (R. page 34)." 
Defendants were unable to find any cases where this Court has previously considered the 
question of whether a claimant must be advised by his physician to quit his job. However, this 
question was considered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a frequently cited case, 
Deiss v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 475 Pa. 547, 381 A. 2d 132 (1977). 
In Deiss SUPRA., 1 ALR 4th at 801, the Court held: 
"We believe that... the relevant consideration is the claimant's health at the time of 
terminating employment. If a claimant realizes that either physically or emotionally 
he is unable to continue working and he offers competent testimony that at time of 
termination, adequate health reasons existed to justify termination, we can perceive 
no reason to require claimant to prove that he was advised to quit his job. 
"In the instant case, appellant was under a psychotherapist's care for over a year 
before terminating his employment with Gordon. The psychotherapist testified that at 
the time of termination, appellant would have suffered a nervous breakdown had he 
continued his employment. This opinion was based on the results of over one year of 
analysis prior to appellant's termination of employment." 
In this case, as in Deiss, the claimant realized that he was unable to continue working and 
offered competent evidence that at the time of termination, adequate health reasons existed to 
justify termination. That evidence was a letter from his doctor of seven years which stated in 
part: 
"I. have been aware of pressures and stresses that the patient has had with respect to 
his work for some time and have monitored this over the past year. Recently, these 
stresses have increased and have been associated with an exacerbation of angina. It 
is my feeling that this is an extension of his underlying medical problem of 
documented coronary disease in the past. Had I been consulted with respect to this 
cond1t1on, 1t would have been my advice that Mr. Flint remove himself from the 
stressful situation which was precipitating his coronary disease. As I would have 
anticipated, his pain has stopped since he has been relieved of this." (R. page 19) 
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His doctor substantiates claimant's own testimony that the stress from his job was 
exacerbating his health problem. He also 1 ndicates an awareness of those pressures ano 
stresses the claimant was under and states he had been monitoring this over the past year lti: 
clear, therefore, that the correct interpretation of claimant's answer to the question, "Didyoui 
doctor advise you to quit your job?", where he answers, "No, I didn't discuss this with mi 
doctor .. ," (R. page 34) is precisely what he said-he didn't discuss quitting his job with his 
doctor. Plaintiff's assertion that claimant "did not once report to the doctor that he was havin~ 
chest pains or that he was bothered by his problems at work until well after he quit," is simpli 
not supported by the record. 
CCH Unemployment Insurance Reporter, Volume 10, Utah-General Rules of Adjudication. 
Para. 5507 K (2)(c) provides: 
"A worker who has left employment because of illness or disability, has the burden of 
establishing that the condition actually existed and that it was sufficient to cause him 
to leave work when he did." 
Defendants submit claimant met that burden. 
SUMMARY 
The Record does contain evidence to support the findings of the Board of Reviewthatthe 
claimant quit work with good cause. 
Claimant was doing his work to the full satisfaction of his immediate supervisor (A. pages 
39-41 ). Nevertheless his political opponent to whom he lost an election was harassing hirnbi 
making demands for reports that other department heads weren't required to make (A. pages . 
i 
40 and 41) and by seeking the cooperation of the sheriff in complaining against himtotne' 
commission. Other harassment occurred weekly (R. page 41 ). He recognized he shouldn'lletit 
bother him but it did (R. page 41 ). His supervisor also recognized that it was bothering him.bu! 
was unable to stop it (R. page 41 ). His doctor had advised him because of a coronary, to cease 
any activity that caused him chest pains, shortness of breath or discomfort (R. page 371 
10 
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Claimant realized that the harassment and problems at work were causing him the chest pains 
his doctor had warned him about. He feared this would bring on another coronary and quit (R. 
pages 37 and 38) 
Plaintiff claims claimant created his own stress by refusing to submit to the demands of the 
Auditor Defendant submits that the animosity claimant felt because of the harassment would 
not have disappeared by submitting. All the old antagonisms would have arisen anew within 
him with each submission of a detailed time report which the Plaintiff's own representative 
acknowledged no one else was required to submit. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in support of the decision of the Board of Review is both competent and 
substantial. The decisions allowing benefits to the claimant should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ____ day of January, 1981. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, 
Attorney General 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
K. Allan Zabel 
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DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Defendant's Brieflo 
JON J. BUNDERSON, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 45 North First East. Brigham City, 
Utah 84302, this day of January, 1981. 
BY: 
K. Allan Zabel 
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